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PROMISES TO PAY IN THE FUTURE-A MODEST PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM
DON W. LLEWELLYN
The author examines the law regarding tax treatment of promises
to pay in the future and finds it in a state of confusion. After
discussing the inequities arising from the differing treatment ac-
corded cash and accrual basis taxpayers the author suggests a
number of changes in the tax treatment of installment sales and
annuities given in exchange for property. The author also makes
suggestions for simplification of the concept of cash equivalence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At some point tax complexity leads to a breakdown of the self-
assessment system. Some believe that with respect to the tax conse-
quences of promises to pay in the future the stress limit is perilously
close-if, in fact, it has not already been reached.' The legal test for
determining the so-called "cash equivalence" of such promises has
never been clearly articulated. In addition the ultimate tax conse-
quences of such a promise cannot be determined without resolving
complex marketability and valuation questions.
In most cases it is the cash basis taxpayer who has to cope with
these complexities. Although the term, cash basis, gives a contrary
implication, the receipt of property as well as money will result in
a realization of income for the cash basis taxpayer. A promise to pay
in the future does not fit neatly into either the category of property
or cash but may, depending on the form of the promise, have some
1. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Tax Simplification-A Practioner's View, NAT'L. TAx J. 317
(1973).
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attributes of both. The determination of what attributes of the
promise will cause its receipt to be treated as a realization of income
is referred to as a question of cash equivalence-it could just as
properly be termed a question of property equivalence.
The accrual basis taxpayer, on the other hand, realizes income
at the time when an obligation to pay becomes fixed and the amount
of that obligation can be reasonably ascertained.' The receipt of a
bare promise by the accrual basis taxpayer frequently will satisfy
these two requirements. There are occasions, however, where the
receipt of a promise to pay in the future will precede the events
which fix the right to receive payment. Equating the receipt of the
note with the receipt of cash will result in a realization of income
for the accrual basis taxpayer. Even accrual basis taxpayers cannot
defer income beyond receipt.' More importantly, there is authority
for treating all obligations for future payment received in connection
with sales of real property and casual sales of personal property in
a uniform way regardless of the taxpayer's method of accounting.4
Therefore, the development of the concept of cash equivalence for
promises to pay in the future can be significant to the accrual basis
taxpayer as well as the cash basis taxpayer.
Some clarification and simplification of the cash equivalence
doctrine may be on its way. In Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,'
the Ninth Circuit interpreted section 1001(b) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code6 as requiring all rights to future payment (even those not
evidenced by a separate promissory note or other indicia of cash
equivalence) to be realized by the cash basis taxpayer to the extent
of the fair market value of the promise.7 The most dramatic impact
of this decision occurs in situations where the taxpayer sells a capi-
tal asset in return for deferred payments and section 453 installment
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1957).
3. Schulude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963). In this case the receipt by an accrual
basis taxpayer of a negotiable note was equated with a cash receipt and was held to constitute
gross income. The recipient of the note had not yet performed the services promised and
absent the delivery of the note there would have been no accrual or income.
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a) (1977): But see Western Oaks Building Corp., 49 T.C. 365,
372 n.4 (1968).
5. 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
6. I.R.C. § 1001 (b) provides: "[tihe amount realized from the sale or other disposition
of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of property
(other than money) received." This is the provision under which gains from the sale of real
property and casual sales of personal property are computed.
7. 524 F.2d at 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1975).
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reporting is either not available or not elected. Not only does the
seller have an immediate realization to the extent of the fair market
value of the obligation for future payments but, in addition, there
is a termination or closing of the sale for purposes of characteriza-
tion. This means that when the seller receives future payments the
tax on those payments will be determined without reference to the
character of the sale. The income portion of such receipt (the differ-
ence between the face amount of the obligation and the fair market
value) will be taxed as ordinary income regardless of the capital
nature of the asset. For example: if a capital asset having a tax basis
of $20,000 is transferred in return for a promissory note with a face
amount of $40,000 and a fair market value of $30,000 the fair market
value would be an immediate realization and the $10,000 of capital
gain ($30,000 fair market value minus $20,000 basis) would be sub-
ject to immediate recognition. The remaining $10,000 ($40,000 face
amount minus $30,000 fair market value) if received would be ordi-
nary income.
The theory underlying the government's position in Warren
Jones Co. is not clear but it appears to be that the term "property"
as used in section 1001(b) includes all obligations for future pay-
ment which have an ascertainable fair market value including those
obligations which do not meet the requirements of the cash equiva-
lence tests.' The court's acceptance of the government's position is
based on the legislative history of sections 1001(b) and 453. The
court attached great significance to the changes made in the lan-
guage of section 202(c) [predecessor of section 1001(b)] by the Rev-
enue Act of 1924.1 The following language was eliminated: "On an
exchange of property, real, personal or mixed, for any other such
property, no gain or loss shall be recognized unless the property
received in exchange has a readily realizable market value. . .. .I'
The above language was replaced by what now appears as the
present section 1001(b). Such a change hardly seems conclusive but
the court determined that Congress did intend by the change to
treat all obligations for future payment as a realization, and when,
in 1926, Congress enacted the installment sales provisions it was
8. Warren Jones Co., 524 F.2d 788, 791 n.6 (9th Cir. 1975).
9. Rev. Act of 1924, ch. 234 § 203, 43 Stat. 256. (now I.R.C. § 1001 (6)).
10. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136 § 202(c), 42 Stat. 230. (now I.R.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis
supplied)).
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motivated by a desire to alleviate the hardship of immediate recog-
nition resulting from the 1924 amendment. In any event, itis clear
from the legislative history that as early as 1928, and probably ear-
lier, Congress was aware of consistent Treasury policy to treat all
obligations received in property transfer cases as a realization. In
fact, in 1928, at the time it proposed an increase in the allowable
initial payment for installment reporting from 25% of selling price
to 40% of selling price, the Senate Finance Committee commented
as follows:
It has been suggested, particularly in connection with such in-
stallment sales sales transactions, that in lieu of the increase of
the 25 per centum limitation, gain or loss should not be recog-
nized on receipt of installment obligations or other property if no
fair market value is determinable therefore with reasonable cer-
tainty by the application of standards customarily accepted in
business practice. This suggestion involves altering the consistent
practice of the Treasury Department of finding a fair market
value of property in all cases where there is an ascertainable
value. This committee has recommended no change in the exist-
ing law as to these matters. .. "
The legislative history supports the position that Congress intended
that ascertainable market value of promises to pay in the future,
and not cash equivalence, control realization in section 1001(b)
transactions.
Although no definition of cash equivalence would be unani-
mously accepted, there is general agreement that the most impor-
tant factor in determining cash equivalence is marketability at a
reasonable discount.'2 This was the standard applied by a majority
of the Tax Court in Warren Jones Co., where the Tax Court con-
cluded that the substantial difference between the fair market value
and the face amount of the obligation to pay in the future negated
cash equivalence and, therefore, the receipt of the obligation was
not a realizable event.'" The Ninth Circuit reversal of the Tax Court
11. S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1928).
12. Cowden, Sr. v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961), on remand, 30 T.C.M.
(P-H) 61, 229 (1961); Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951); Harold W. Johnson, 14 T.C. 560
(1950).
13. The fair market value was approximately 50% of the face value. The fair market
value was determined by reducing the discounted value by a required security deposit of
$41,000 which was in a savings account assigned as security to the purchaser of the obligation.
Warren Jones Co., 60 T.C. 663, 667 (1973).
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in Warren Jones Co. should not be interpreted as a rejection of the
Tax Court's standards for determining cash equivalence. The Ninth
Circuit indicated that the result it reached would be the same
whether it was based on a theory that cash equivalence is not
required under section 1001(b), or a theory that every obligation
with a fair market value is the equivalence of cash. 4 The court,
therefore, concluded that there was no need to distinguish between
them. The author, however, would strongly urge the adoption of the
former theory.
The first step in clarifying the concept of cash equivalence is
to segregate section 1001(b) transactions, casual sale of personal
property and all sales of real property, from other transactions in
which obligations for future payments are obtained. The concept
has been adulterated because of the Service's zeal in attempting to
reduce the opportunities for prolonged deferral in section 1001(b)
transactions. The opportunity for deferral of gain in section 1001(b)
transactions results from the use of the open transaction (sometimes
called deferred-payment) method of reporting gain. Under this
method no gain is reported until the seller receives cash payments
in excess of the basis of the property transferred. 6 The Service's goal
is to limit such reporting to transfers where the obligation for future
payments has no ascertainable market value. Furthermore, the
Service's position is that only in rare and extraordinary cases will
an obligation be considered as having no fair market value."'
More extensive use of the open transaction method has been
justified, however, on a theory that a bare obligation of a buyer to
pay in the future is not property and, unless the obligation has
attributes such as ready marketability, it is not the equivalent of
cash. This cost recovery method of reporting, which permits the cost
basis of the promise to pay to be recovered before ordinary income
is realized is available only where the obligation is considered specu-
lative. 8 Thus gain cannot be computed under section 1001(b) and
is necessarily deferred until the payments received on the obligation
14. Warren Jones Co. 524 F.2d 788, 791 n.6 (1975). Judge Tannenwald, in his dissent in
the Tax Court, advances a different theory in making readily marketable at any discount the
only test.
15. This was the theory adopted by Judge Quealy in his dissenting opinion in the Tax
Court, 60 T.C. 663, 673-74 (1973).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1958).
17. Id.
18. Morton Liftin, 36 T.C. 909 (1961), aff'd, 317 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1963).
134119771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
exceed the basis of the transferred property. In a word, the transac-
tion remains "open."
Conversely, if a bare promise for future payment constitutes
property as that term is used in section 1001(b), then the sale trans-
action is immediately "closed" on receipt of such obligation. The
Service has contended with singular success that this "closing" has
the concomitant effect of insulating the actual receipt of the pay-
ments promised and, therefore, the income from such receipt is
characterized and reported without reference to the sale. 9 The tax
treatment for the receipt of payments is then the same as that
applied to payments on obligations acquired for cash.2 Each pay-
ment is apportioned between return of basis and ordinary income.'
A persuasive argument can be made under the rationale of
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner" that income resulting from future
payments should be characterized by reference to the closed prop-
erty transfer. In Arrowsmith shareholders who had in an earlier year
reported a long term capital gain on receipt of a liquidation distribu-
tion were limited to long term capital loss treatment when a portion
of the liquidation distribution had to be repaid to the corporation.
The Supreme Court noted the relationship of the repayment to the
liquidation distribution 3 and held that merely characterizing a later
event by reference to an earlier event did not necessarily violate the
sanctity of the annual accounting period." The same kind of indul-
gence could be exercised with respect to receipt of payments on
obligations obtained in closed property transfers. Unfortunately the
Arrowsmith doctrine has always been limited to deduction cases
and this restriction seems too well rooted in the tax law to be
changed by court decision.2"
19. Darby Investment Corp., 37 T.C. 839 (1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1963);
Shafga Realty Corp., 8 B.T.A. 283 (1927).
20. Herbert S. Witte, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72, 232 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d
391 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
21. Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952); Wingate E. Underhill, 45
T.C. 489 (1966). If the obligor is a corporation or government, section 1232 of the Code would
be applicable and a portion of the income could qualify for capital gain. The formula for the
proration to bases is: F.M.V. of note + Face amount of note.
22. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 9.
25. See Rabinowitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Conse-
quences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAx L. REv. 85, 101 (1972).
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II. SECTION 453 INSTALLMENT SALES REPORTING-AN ALTERNATIVE
Where section 453 of the Code is elected the obligation of the
buyer is valued at face, regardless of actual fair market value, for
purposes of computing the realized and recognized gain."6 The gain
is characterized by reference to the sale of the property and no
income is reported until an actual payment is received. The income
reported on receipt of payment is that proportion of the payment
which the total gain bears to the total price." Thus with respect to
the characterization of gain, the tax is the same under section 453
installment reporting as under the open transaction method of re-
porting. But, unlike the open transaction method of reporting where
gain is deferred until the basis is recovered in full, section 453 pro-
vides for ratable recognition of gain.
Obviously many taxpayers will continue to elect section 453
installment reporting rather than risk rejection of the open transac-
tion method of reporting the gain. Such a calculation of risk is made
on the assumption that adoption of the open transaction method
forecloses a later election of section 453. This assumption appears
to be inaccurate. Neither the statute nor the regulations contain a
specific time requirement for the election. The Commissioner an-
nounced twelve years ago 8 that a revision of the regulations was
forthcoming, but it is still long overdue. It is clear, however, that
reporting gain by a method that is inconsistent with installment
reporting forecloses a later election to report the gain under section
453.15 Nevertheless, at least one case has held that a taxpayer can
elect to report the gain under section 453 notwithstanding the fact
that the gain was initially erroneously reported as an open transac-
tion.3 The court reasoned that an invalid election (in this case erro-
neous treatment as an open transaction) is tantamount to no elec-
tion; the gain must be recalculated in any event and, therefore, the
court allowed the taxpayer to elect the installment method. Al-
though this reasoning is suspect, it has apparently influenced the
26. Frizzelle Farms Inc., 61 T.C. 737, 741-42 (1974), afJd per curiam, 511 F.2d 1009 (4th
Cir. 1975).
27. I.R.C. § 453 (a)(1).
28. R.L.C. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 C.B. at 152 (revoking Rev. Rul. 93, 1953-1 C.B. at 92).
29. Albert Vischia, 26 T.C. 1027 (1956); Strauss v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 855 (1935),
affd, 87 F.2d 1918 (2d Cir. 1937).
30. Mamula v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1965). Contra, George E. Frietas,
35 T.C.M. (P-H) 66,105 (1966).
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Commissioner. In Warren Jones Co., the Commissioner conceded
the validity of a section 453 election which was conditioned on the
rejection of open transaction reporting."
The well informed taxpayer will not be impelled by this prece-
dent to forego additional deferment under open transaction report-
ing. He will simply adopt the open transaction method of reporting
and make a conditional section 453 election in the year of sale.
Warren Jones Co. appears to have no in terrorem effect.
Of course, uniform acceptance of the Ninth Circuit's interpre-
tation of section 1001(b) would virtually bring an end to the pro-
longed deferral of gain. All sales of property whether casual or in the
regular course of business would be subject to computation either
under section 1001(b) or the accrual method of accounting. Vir-
tually all regular course of business sales of personalty would be
inventory sales and gain would be realized immediately under the
mandatory accrual method of accounting by valuing all buyer obli-
gations at face.2 Casual sales of real or personal property will be
subject to the gain computation rules of section 1001(b) whether the
taxpayer is on the accrual or cash method of accounting.3 Under
section 1001(b) promises for future payment would be regarded as
property and realized to the extent of fair market value even though
the seller was on the accrual method. In effect, the method of ac-
counting of the seller has no significance in section 1001(b) property
transfers because section 1001(b) supplies the method for comput-
ing gain.
At first blush, dealer sales of real property for a promise to pay
in the future would appear to permit a third alternative for the
computation of gain. Even where sold by a dealer, real property is
not classified as inventory 4 so that gains from real estate sales are
not required to be computed under the accrual method of account-
31. Warren Jones Co., 60 T.C. 663, 666 (1973).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2) mandates the use of accrual accounting where the use of
any inventory is necessary. I.R.C. § 471 requires inventories in most mercantile, manufactur-
ing, wholesale or retail sales businesses. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S.
182, 185 (1934) and First Savings and Loan Assoc., 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963) make it clear that
in regular course of business sales accrual basis taxpayers value obligations for future pay-
ment at face.
33. See S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 653-54 (ed. 1960); Comment,
Cash Equivalence, 22 U.C.L.A.L. R~v. 219, 225 n.6 (1974).
34. O.D. 848, 4 C.B. 47 (1921); Atlantic Coast Realty v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 416
(1928).
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ing. A logical case also could be made for permitting the real estate
dealer to compute gain without reference to section 1001(b). It is an
acknowledged tax principle that the computation rule of section
1001(b) yields to the seller's regular method of accounting for regu-
lar course of business sales of stock in trade." Therefore, it may
appear that by electing the cash method of accounting the real
estate dealer could not only avoid the closing of the sale under
section 1001(b) but also, as a cash basis taxpayer, report the gain
under the open transaction method. But once again, history rather
than logic and the exception rather than the general rule controls.
The legislative history of section 1001(b) indicates that Congress
intended that all gains from real property sales, whether casual or
in the regular course of business, be computed under section
1001(b). 36
Pursuit of the proverbial "bottom line" to Warren Jones Co.
leads to the following conclusions: (1) fair market value and not
cash equivalence is the vel non of realization for buyer obligations
to pay in the future obtained in connection with any sales of real
property or any casual sales of personal property. The Service will
continue to take the position that fair market value can be ascer-
tained except where the circumstances are extraordinary. Thus
market value will be ascertainable except where the obligation to
pay or the amount to be paid is contingent. (2) Even where such
sales are made by the accrual basis taxpayer, the realization will be
computed by valuing the obligations at fair market value rather
than face value. Section 1001(b) (under the Warren Jones Co. inter-
pretation) appears to leave no room for varying the treatment re-
gardless of the taxpayer's method of accounting. 7 The Service will
have to discontinue using a double standard, i.e., advocating the
independent operation of section 1001(b) for a cash basis taxpayer
while at the same time contending that the accrual basis taxpayer's
35. See discussion in S. SURREY AND W. WARREN, supra note 33.
36. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. § 202(c) at 13 (1924). In addition, the statutory
structure of I.R.C. section 453 which treats casual sales of personal property and all sales of
real property under subsection (b) and personal property sold in the regular course of business
under subsection (a) is a similar indication.
37. The Service at present takes the inconsistent position that cash basis taxpayers are
subject to section 1001(b) computation but that 1001(b) is not the computation rule applied
to accrual basis taxpayers. The courts have supported this position. Western Oaks Bldg.
Corp., 49 T.C. 365, 373-75 (1968); First Savings and Loan Assoc., 40 T.C. 474 (1963).
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realization is computed by valuing the buyer's obligation at the face
amount.
Litigation will probably continue until these legal principles are
uniformly accepted or rejected since the fair market value of the
obligation will control not only the amount of gain or loss from the
sale but also the potential amount of ordinary income from receipt
of payments on the obligations. For example, where highly appre-
ciated capital gain property is exchanged for an obligation which
has a fair market value that is lower than the basis of the property
exchanged, the anomalous result would be a capital loss followed by
a substantial realization of ordinary income."
All of this potential litigation would be avoided if agreement
could be reached on reform. A distinguished tax practitioner39 advo-
cated such reform at the NTA-TIA Tax Symposium held two years
prior to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Warren Jones Co. The essence
of his proposal is still the key to sensible reform: all sales of real
property and all casual sales of personal property for a price payable
in whole or in part by fixed future payments would be reported
under a more inclusive statutory provision for installment reporting
unless the seller elects immediate realization of the full face amount
of the buyer obligation. This proposal could be statutorily imple-
mented by: (1) eliminating the "two payment rule" 0 and the year
of sale thirty percent payment limitation from section 453; (2) re-
versing the election procedure so that the taxpayer elects out of,
rather than into, section 453 installment reporting; and (3) imposing
as the cost of such election immediate realization of the full face
amount of the obligation to pay in the future.
In those cases where the total amount realized cannot be deter-
mined at the time of sale because all or some of the payments are
contingent, any gain that can be determined including gain which
is only remotely contingent, should be reported under section 453
installment reporting except where the taxpayer elects to report
38. This could happen frequently if the Tax Court, when ascertaining the fair market
value, insists on reducing the amount of a required security deposit from the going discount
rate.
39. See Ginsburg, Tax Simplification: A P'ractioner's View 26 NAT. TAX. J. 317 (1973).
The author has expanded and modified his original proposal. See Ginsburg, Proposal for
Structural Reform 30 TAX. L. REV, 471 (1975).
40. The Tax Court interpretation is that installment sales require at least two payments.
Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1283 (Ct. Cl. 1973); 10-42 Corpora-
tion, 55 T.C. 593 (1971).
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such gain immediately. But any gain which cannot be determined
at the time of sale should be treated as resulting from an open
transaction whether the taxpayer is on the cash or accrual method.4"
A different result should occur where the total gain on the sale
cannot be determined at the time of sale because the buyer's obliga-
tion is in the form of an annuity (a promise to pay a specific sum
annually, or in more frequent intervals, for the life of the seller).
Separate tax treatment of annuities is warranted because: (1) there
is a market place where values are fixed for annuities issued in
ordinary course by commercial enterprises; (2) some approximation
of the value of all annuities, commercial and private, can be made
by the use of mortality tables in conjunction with projections for
the earning power of money;4" and (3) there is a separate legislative
scheme for taxing annuities.43 In Situations where the obligor has
not, at least from time to time, issued other annuity contracts, the
methods for valuation specified above become quite speculative
since other factors, including the likelihood of full performance,
must be considered in determining whether the value of the private
annuity can be sufficiently ascertained for purposes of immediate
recognition of gain or loss. Where there is a determination that the
private annuity cannot be adequately valued, the sale cannot be
closed and the reporting of the gain will have to be deferred.44
The need for additional clarification of the guidelines for deter-
mining whether the receipt of a private annuity results in immedi-
ate recognition or permits a special kind of deferred reporting will
be apparent after a brief exposure to their chronological develop-
ment.
The House version of the 1954 Code contained a specific provi-
sion for property transfers in exchange for a private annuity. This
provision, which was later deleted by the Senate-Finance Commit-
tee provided:
41. Permitting the accrual basis taxpayer to report on the open transaction method
complies with the tax principle that the accrual basis taxpayer should be treated as a cash
basis taxpayer where the receipt of property or money precedes the time for realization under
the accrual method. The time for realization under the accrual method would not arise until
the contingent event occured. See Goetz Gasket and Packing Co., Inc., 24 T.C. 249 (1955);
See also note 3 supra.
42. For discussion of value see Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
43. I.R.C. § 72.
44. See, Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
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If a taxpayer exchanges property (other than money) for a consid-
eration which includes an annuity contract, the value of the an-
nuity contract computed without regard to the financial condi-
tion of the obligor shall be included in the amount realized on
such exchange. Such value shall be deemed the amount of prem-
ium and other consideration paid for purposes of section 72.11
The intent of this bill was to change the effect of the case law which
at that time permitted the seller on receipt of an unsecured private
annuity to defer the recognition of the gain realized on the sale and
to have his tax position governed largely by the annuity rules of
section 72 of the Code." The exclusion ratio7 under section 72,
which is'used to determine what portion of each annuity payment
constitutes a return of investment, was to be calculated by treating
the fair market value of the property transferred as the investment
in the annuity contract. The gain from the property sale, the excess
of the fair market value over the basis of the property transferred,
was not reported until the aggregate amount of the exclusion ratio
portion of the annuity payments exceeded the basis of the property
transferred-a type of open transaction reporting.
In Revenue Ruling 69-7411 the Service took the position that: (1)
the gain realized on the sale of property in return for a private
annuity is computed at the time of the sale by treating the value of
the annuity as the amount realized; (2) the excess of the fair market
value of the transferred property over the value of the annuity con-
stitutes a gift for gift tax purposes, except where the transaction is
at arm's length; (3) the seller's investment in the annuity for pur-
poses of computing the exclusion ratio under section 72 of the Code
is the basis of the property transferred to acquire the annuity; (4)
the gain realized on the sale should be reported ratably over the
period of years measured by the life expectancy of the seller; and
(5) the portion of the annuity payment which exceeds the exclusion
ratio plus the portion reportable as gain is reported as ordinary
income.
45. Section 1241 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as reported in H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1954).
46. Commissioner v. Estate of Kann, 174 F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1949); Hill's Estate v.
Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
47. Exclusion ratio is the quotient obtained by dividing the seller's investment for the
contract by the expected return under the contract.
48. 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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The Ruling drastically altered the previously accepted treat-
ment." It changes not only the method of reporting the gain on the
sale from the open transaction method to installment reporting, it
also reduced the exclusion ratio. The exclusion ratio remains applic-
able after the seller has reached his life expectancy, the point where
all deferred sales gain has been reported. Thus the reduced exclu-
sion ratio has the effect of increasing the amount of ordinary income
to be reported by a seller who lives beyond his life expectancy. Six
Tax Court judges, who dissented from the majority in a 1973 opinion
which required immediate recognition of a secured private annuity,
approved in principle both the method for computing realized gain
and the installment reporting prescribed by the Ruling.5" The same
judges disagreed, however, with the Ruling's position on calculation
of the exclusion ratio. They determined that the exclusion ratio
should be calculated by treating the value of the annuity at the time
of the sale as the investment in the annuity contract."
It must also be noted that in a 1972 regulation, which contains
a tax computation for a bargain sale of property to a charity in
return for an annuity, the value of the annuity at the time of sale is
treated as the investment in the annuity." This regulation may or
may not reflect a change in the Service's position set forth in Reve-
nue Ruling 69-74. If a change was intended the present Service
position deserves endorsement. It is reasonable to require that real-
ized gain from the property transfer be computed on receipt of the
annuity by approximating its value. Otherwise there would be no
way to separate gain income from annuity income. Although many
would argue that the rejection of cost recovery reporting in favor of
ratable reporting of that gain is without judicial or legislative sup-
port, such ratable reporting is reasonable and well within the spirit
of the aforementioned reform proposals.
The Service accedes to ratable reporting only where the annuity
can be classified as private rather than commercial or quasi-
commercial. To pass muster as a private annuity under the test set
forth in Revenue Ruling 62-136,11 the obligor's experience cannot
reveal any regular or irregular pattern of issuing annuities. The
49. Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53. (revoked by Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43).
50. Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
51. Id. at 476.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2(c) Example (8) (1972).
53. 1962-2 C.B. 12.
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issuance of the annuity must be an isolated event. Interestingly,
1972 Regulation 1.1011-2(a)(4) expressly provides for private annu-
ity treatment where a charity promises to pay only the transferor,
or the transferor and a designated survivor, a nonassignable annu-
ity. Since the regulation makes no reference to the experience or
future intentions of the charity with respect to issuance of annuities
it is not clear whether this constitutes a change in the position set
forth in Revenue Ruling 62-136.11
Although the regulation referred to above does not deal with the
effect of securing the annuity, the Tax Court's position in the past
has been that the seller's gain must be reported immediately on
receipt of a secured promise to pay an annuity.55 Obviously the
security reduces the uncertainty of performance, and, therefore, has
a direct effect on the marketability of the promise. The Tax Court
seems to regard the risk of performance as the controlling issue in
determining whether to treat the sale as "closed" or to permit de-
ferred reporting." The court seems to be misplacing its focus. There
is nothing really unique about the risk of performance in annuity
cases. The unique feature in annuity cases is the contingency of
death of the annuitant. It is this contingency that restricts the mar-
ketability of the annuity and causes valuation to be speculative at
best." It is this same contingency which makes section 453 install-
ment reporting inappropriate.
Nevertheless, on balance one must conclude that it would take
little more than clarification to bring simplicity and predictability
to the private annuity transaction. This could be accomplished by
a slight modification of Revenue Ruling 69-74. Such a modification
should incorporate the following principles: (1) except where the
seller takes his property to the commercial market to acquire an
annuity, the gain should be reported under the ratable reporting
method set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-74. (2) Such reporting should
be permitted whether the promise is secured or unsecured and re-
gardless of the annuity experience of any obligor other than a full-
fledged commercial entity. (3) Except where the circumstances in-
54. Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 C.B. 12.
55. See Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184, 189 (8th Cir. 1973); Estate of
Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973). See also Haley, The Application of Section 1001 to Pre-
ferred Payment Sales of Property, 28 TAx LAW. 303 (1975).
56. See, J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936).
57. Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973) (dissenting opinion by Simpson, J.).
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dicate a bargain sale of the property, i.e., where the property is
transferred to a charity or a natural object of the seller's bounty, the
annuity should be valued for realization purposes by reference to the
fair market value of the property transferred and not the value of
the annuity at date of transfer s
III. CASH EQUIVALENCE
The modest reform suggested above for section 1001(b) transac-
tions would bring predictability and simplicity to the property
transfer cases. In addition, in all other transactions, it would permit
the cash equivalence doctrine to develop as a uniform and managea-
ble test of realization where obligations to pay in the future are
received by cash basis taxpayers. Although tax treatment appears
to vary with the subject matter of the transaction,59 once the prop-
erty transactions are set apart, common guidelines emerge for all
other transactions. 0
With the exception of section 1001(b) the Code does not treat
as property a promise for future payment unless it is the promise of
a third party. In that case by dealing with third party obligations
the parties to the transaction are clearly manifesting an intent to
treat the third party obligation as property. Where one party to the
transaction becomes obligated to make a payment in the future to
the other party to the transaction, there is no realization of income
to a cash basis obligee unless the obligation is endowed with addi-
tional attributes called cash equivalence.6 '
The primary question of intent must be resolved before deter-
mining whether the obligation will be treated as a cash equivalent.
There will be no cash equivalence if it can be established that the
receipt of the promise, whatever the form, was not intended as
payment but merely as evidence of the indebtedness. The primacy
58. This would be a valuation technique conparable to that in U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S.
65 (1962).
59. See, Brandis, The Treatment Accorded Promissory Notes Under the Federal Income
Tax Law, 52 N.C.L. REv. 93 (1973).
60. It is true that with respect to promises to pay in the future for services the only test
appears to be intent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1977). In other areas intent seems to
play a minimal role. Nevertheless the ultimate test for all transactions other than property
seems to be intent as determined from the objective evidence of marketability.
61. Certainly the cash basis taxpayer has no income on the creation of an open account.
This is the point of distinction between the cash basis taxpayer and the accrual basis tax-
payer. Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1957) (emphasis added).
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of the intent test clearly emerges in transactions involving services
or loans. The regulation dealing with compensation for services
under section 61 of the Code states: "[niotes or other evidences
of indebtedness received in payment for services constitute income
in the amount of their fair market value." 2 An earlier regulation
refering to notes "received in payment for services and not merely
as security for such payment" 3 more clearly reflected the import-
ance of the intent test. Under the current regulation, courts still
continue to retain the payment intent test.64 Thus, where a lessor
has received promissory notes for future rent the courts have looked
to the parties' intent.5 If the notes were intended as advanced pay-
ment of rents then there is immediate recognition of income. On the
other hand, if the court finds that the notes are merely additional
evidences of the indebtedness no income is recognized.
In the related situation where notes are received in loan trans-
actions the Service has decided that its treatment of payments
made on those notes will turn on the intent of the parties. Revenue
Ruling 63-5711 dealt with a situation where a borrower made a note
to a lender in exchange for an amount of cash less than the face
amount of the note. The difference between the face amount of the
note and the cash advanced represented add-on interest. Where the
parties had agreed that all payments on the note were to be applied
first to the principle the intent of the parties governed and the
Service ruled that the lender would not have to report as income any
payments made on the note until it had received payments equal
to the amount advanced. The intent of the parties governs even
where a new note is issued to a cash basis lender for interest already
due. No income is recognized unless there is an intent to receive the
note as payment. 7
Obviously the intent of the parties will be determined in large
part by the objective evidence. The best evidence is the form and
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1957).
63. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 34.
64. See, e.g., Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U.S. 287 (1889); Schlemmer v. United States, 94
F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938); Joe W. Scales, 18 T.C. 1263 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 211 F.2d
133 (8th Cir. 1954); A. Hovey-King, 19 T.C.M. (P-H) 277 (1950); Great Southern Life Ins.
Co., 36 B.T.A. 828 (1937); San Jacinto Life Ins. Co., 36 B.T.A. 186 (1936).
65. Compare, Astor Holding Co., 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1084 (1942), aff'd, 135 F.2d 47 (5th
Cir. 1943) with Gates v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1934).
66. 1963-1 C.B. 103, 105.
67. Joe W. Scales, 18 T.C. 1263 (1952).
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nature of the obligation itself. If the promise is in the form of a note
that can be freely assigned and a ready market exists where the note
can be discounted at some reasonable rate, a strong inference can
be drawn that the note was accepted as payment. On the other hand
if the obligation is not readily tradeable at a reasonable discount a
strong inference can be drawn that it was not intended as payment.
Cases may exist where the actual intentions of the parties are differ-
ent than the logical inferences suggested by the marketability of the
promise, but the taxpayer in that case would face a substantial
burden of proof which probably could not be met unless other facts
about the transaction could be offered as substantiation.A"
It is true that many factors such as the security for the obliga-
tion, the financial status of the debtor, and the conditional or un-
conditional nature of the liability have to be considered in resolving
the question of marketability. But predictability is within tolerable
levels.
If the Service in a spirit -of compromise would openly acknowl-
edge that the intent of the parties is paramount in resolving cash
equivalence and agreed to challenge taxpayer treatment of such
obligations only in those cases where the taxpayer claimed an intent
contrary to the inferences suggested by the form and nature of the
obligation, litigation would be reduced and opportunities for abuse
would be minimal. Also the really difficult questions of market val-
uation would arise only where a ready market did not exist and then
only when the taxpayer opted for the immediate realization of an
obligation which was not readily tradeable.
The stage is set for meaningful and comprehensive reform. It
can be accomplished without radical alteration of established legal
principles since little more than agreement on the ground rules
would be required.,
68. Schlemmer v. U.S., 94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938).
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